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Abstract
In line with the sensorimotor contingency theory, we investigate the problem of
the perception of space from a fundamental sensorimotor perspective. Despite
its pervasive nature in our perception of the world, the origin of the concept
of space remains largely mysterious. For example in the context of artificial
perception, this issue is usually circumvented by having engineers pre-define the
spatial structure of the problem the agent has to face. We here show that the
structure of space can be autonomously discovered by a naive agent in the form
of sensorimotor regularities, that correspond to so called compensable sensory
experiences: these are experiences that can be generated either by the agent
or its environment. By detecting such compensable experiences the agent can
infer the topological and metric structure of the external space in which its
body is moving. We propose a theoretical description of the nature of these
regularities and illustrate the approach on a simulated robotic arm equipped
with an eye-like sensor, and which interacts with an object. Finally we show
how these regularities can be used to build an internal representation of the
sensor’s external spatial configuration.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade progress has been made in giving more autonomy to
robots. These achievements are due in large part to the development of ma-
chine learning which progressively replaces formerly hand-crafted features with
features autonomously extracted from data [8]. Yet the ultimate goal of having
a robot perceive its environment in a completely unsupervised way still seems
far out of reach. Current best performing technologies require human beings to
explore the data, interpret it, and provide labels to the robot indicating which
aspects of its perceptual content are of interest [23]. Other more exploratory
approaches try to reduce the human input to a minimum by only providing the
rewards associated to particular tasks [25, 26, 30]. The resulting systems, al-
though often impressive on specific tasks, tend to behave like black-boxes from
which it is difficult to extract what has been perceived by the robot [9, 51], in
turn making any improvement complicated. They also show fairly poor gener-
alization performance, as knowledge acquired while solving a given task does
not transfer well to other tasks [35, 42].
In order to reach a perceptual autonomy on a par with the one observed in
animals, we believe roboticists need to take a step back and question the nature
of the artificial perception they implement in their systems. Are they building
genuine perception? To be truly autonomous, artificial perception needs to be
thought of as a mechanism which empowers the agent itself instead of satis-
fying a performance criterion defined by an engineer. This mechanism has to
be consistent from the intrinsic perspective of the agent, grounded in its sen-
sorimotor experience, the only source of information it has access to [11, 12].
It also needs to account for the different properties of perceptual experiences
and explain how they are relevant for the agent. Only then will we be able to
genuinely understand how abstract perceptual concepts can be grounded in a
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Figure 1: An agent’s physical body and its environment are both immersed in space. However
the agent’s naive ”brain” (information processing system) does not have access to the proper-
ties of space, like its topology or metric, but only to an uninterpreted sensorimotor flow from
which they need to be inferred.
robot’s experience.
The sensorimotor contingency theory (SMCT) [34] has furthermore investi-
gated this question in the more general framework of a theory of perception. It
notably claims that perception relies on an agent’s ability to ”master sensori-
motor contingencies”. The so called sensorimotor contingencies correspond to
regularities induced by the world on the way the agent’s actions transform its
sensory inputs [20]. Beyond the philosophical discussion related to this claim,
which does not belong in this paper, the SMCT standpoint gives rise to prag-
matic consequences for robots. It suggests that they should be able to au-
tonomously acquire perceptual abilities by exploring their sensorimotor space
and by discovering the regularities that the world induces in their experience. In
turn, perception is achieved by identifying the regularities which underlie an on-
going interaction with the world. Moreover properties of the agent’s perceptual
experiences would be directly connected to the properties of their underlying
sensorimotor regularities [33]. The groundbreaking viewpoint proposed by the
SMCT requires a complete overhaul of theories of perception as they are cur-
rently approached in robotics and biology. To date, some perceptual concepts
such as color [38, 50], environment [10], object [16], visual field [15], and space
[18, 21, 36, 48] have been re-addressed through the prism of sensorimotor con-
tingencies.
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The concept of space proves to be of particular interest. Indeed space con-
stitutes an essential component of our perception of the world. A vast majority
of what we perceive, including our body, appears to us as immersed in space
(see Fig. 1). Yet its fundamental nature remains mysterious [14, 32, 40]. In
robotics the notion of space is traditionally considered as given and the prob-
lem of spatial knowledge acquisition bypassed by engineers. This is obviously
true in industrial settings where the position and orientation of each part of
the robot is analytically defined (or measured) [45]. It is also true in more
autonomous settings, like for instance SLAM, where the spatial nature of the
mapping problem and of the robot’s actions are predefined [2]. More surpris-
ingly it is even the case in most developmental experiments involving spatial
knowledge. For example models for body structure discovery and forward model
learning consider the spatial configuration of some part of the robot as known
[4, 27, 41]. Nonetheless completely unsupervised approaches of spatial tasks
do exist [13, 29]. Unfortunately they boil down the robot’s experience to an
all-encompassing performance measure which rules out the specificity of spa-
tial experience. Even a posteriori analyses have so far been unable to unravel
the intricate internal states of those agents [44, 51]. Finally, other approaches
have previously been proposed to ground perceptive experience in an agent’s
sensorimotor experience [3, 31, 39]. However they mainly focused on inferring
properties of the environment without explicitly defining the specific structure
of spatial experience.
In line with the SMCT, we claim that the subjective properties we attribute
to space should be reflected in the properties of the regularities it induces in
our sensorimotor experiences. Space, being ubiquitous in our perception of the
world, should thus significantly shape those experiences. From our perceptual
experience, we can say that space is content-independent, which means that it
does not depend on the nature of the objects it contains2. Space is also shared
2Einstein would of course beg to differ as the theory of relativity describes how mass and
energy distort space-time. However we are only interested here in the scale of interaction that
humans and robots have with their environment, a context in which such distortion does not
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by an agent and its environment, which means that we perceive ourselves as
immersed in the same space as objects that surround us. Finally space has
an isotropic structure, which means that we experience space the same way in
different contexts (different environments, or different positions/orientations of
the agent).
In this work our goal is to understand how these fundamental properties are
grounded in the sensorimotor experience of a robot. We can arguably present
the field of machine learning applied to Robotics as the junction of two endeav-
ors: understanding the data structure that needs to be captured to support
intelligent behavior, and developing algorithmic solutions to capture this struc-
ture. Whereas most effort in the community is oriented towards the latter, we
believe that studying the data structure that can support artificial intelligence
is fundamental, and it is this approach we follow in this work. Our objective is
to shed new light on the possible emergence of space perception, which might
in turn inform the development of future algorithmic solutions to this problem.
Consequently our focus is not on optimizing a controller to solve a spatial task,
or on new machine learning developments, but on the fundamental definition
of the sensorimotor structure underlying spatial knowledge. This definition is
directly inspired by original ideas from H.Poincare´ who wondered more than a
century ago why Euclidean geometry was natural to us [40]. His conclusion was
that space and geometry are revealed to us through the experience of sensory
variations that can be generated either by a motor command of by a change in
the environment. His insights have since been developed to propose ways for a
naive agent to discover the dimension of space [18, 37]. Later they also initi-
ated the sensorimotor characterization of the concepts of rigid displacement [49]
and points of view [21] that space enables. The results presented in this paper
build on these two related concepts to propose a richer characterization of spa-
tial experience. More precisely, we show how space induces invariants in a naive
agent’s sensorimotor experience. We define the space-related invariants that the
manifest directly.
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agent can discover, which correspond to regularities in the way sensory inputs
change when the agent changes its motor configuration or when its environment
changes its own configuration. Intuitively, this approach leads us to describe
space as a redundancy between the agent’s configuration and the environment’s
configuration. Furthermore, the agent can actively experience this redundancy
by compensating for environmental changes through its own actions. We show
how knowledge of these space-related invariants can guide the building of an
internal representation of the agent’s external spatial configuration. Depending
on the nature of the invariants discovered by the agent, this representation can
capture both the topology and the metric regularity of the external space. We
also discuss how the nature of these invariants relate to our experience of space
as content-independent and shared with the environment.
In the following sections we propose a formalism to analyze the sensorimotor
experience of a naive agent as well as how space shapes this experience. Two
illustrative simulations are then presented in which a simple agent extracts
space-induced sensorimotor regularities. Both are based on the detection of
sensorimotor invariants, and allow the agent to build internal representations of
its spatial configuration which respectively capture the topology of space and
the regularity of the metric of space. Finally the experimental and theoretical
results, limitations, and potential improvements of the approach are thoroughly
discussed in the last section of this paper.
2. Problem statement
In this section the question of the perception of space is first addressed
from a theoretical perspective by combining insights from H.Poincare´ and the
SMCT. A mathematical formalization of the problem is then proposed in order
to study how space manifests itself in an agent’s sensorimotor flow. Finally a
simple simulated system on which the simulations of the next two sections will
be evaluated is introduced.
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2.1. The sensorimotor imprint of space
The question of the nature of spatial knowledge arises most strikingly when
taking the standpoint of a naive agent with no a priori knowledge about its
body, its sensors, nor the external world (space included). The sensory flow
produced by typical sensors like cameras and microphones does not contain di-
rect spatial information such as the agent’s position and orientation. Besides,
even assuming that the sensory flow contains such specific information, thanks
to the use of dedicated sensors like gyroscopes or GPS, the agent still needs
to discover what distinguishes these sensory inputs from the non-spatial infor-
mation provided by other inputs. One thus has to specify in what way spatial
information differs from non-spatial information, and why such a distinction is
valuable and immediately useful to the agent.
The experience of a naive agent consists in the uninterpreted incoming sen-
sory flow from its sensors and the uninterpreted motor flow it can send to its
motors. This sensorimotor experience constitutes the ”inner world” the agent
lives in (see Fig. 1). It is obviously different from the external world the agent’s
physical body is embedded in and where space seems to exist as an omnipresent
persistent frame. At any time, the agent is in a certain sensorimotor state, a
point in its internal sensorimotor space, that an external observer would as-
sociate with a rich description of the agent’s configuration and of the content
of its environment. It is important to notice that a sensorimotor state, or its
description by an observer, is not ”spatial” in itself. More precisely, it is the
result of a multitude of parameters, some spatial (like the positions of objects
around the agent) and some non-spatial (like their colors). However changes in
sensorimotor states can be purely spatial, like for instance an object changing
position without changing its color. Sensorimotor changes are thus the means
by which the agent can isolate space from other properties of the world.
The sensorimotor changes an agent can undergo are of different kinds. For
an external observer, either the agent or its environment can be the source of the
change, and in each case the change can be either spatial or non-spatial. We later
refer to non-spatial changes as state changes. For instance, a spatial change of
7
Figure 2: Illustration of an agent-environment system. Displacements in the system have the
particular property of being redundant from a sensory perspective: the sensory change gener-
ated by a displacement of the environment (a) can equivalently be produced by a displacement
of the agent’s sensor (b), and vice versa.
the agent could be the displacement of one of its body parts, a state change due
to the agent could be the modification of a sensor sensitivity, a spatial change of
the environment could be the displacement of an object, and an environmental
state change could be a change of the object’s color or electrical conductivity.
For the naive agent with no prior knowledge about space, there is only one
distinction: some sensory changes occur when motor commands are emitted
(active kind), while others occur while the motor state is static (passive kind).
The agent thus needs to rely on an additional property to distinguish between
spatial and state changes in both active and passive cases.
Intuitions formulated by H.Poincare´ as early as the late 19th century suggest
that such a property does exist in the form of sensory redundancy between the
agent and its environment [40]. Indeed while exploring its inner sensorimotor
world, a naive agent can notice the existence of peculiar sensory changes which
can be generated equivalently by sending a motor command (active mode) or by
observing the consequences of environmental changes (passive mode). We later
refer to these equivalent sensory changes as redundant sensory changes. For
example the sensory change generated by the displacement of the agent with
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respect to an object can also be generated by an opposite displacement of the
object with respect to the agent (see Fig.2). On the contrary sensory changes
induced by a state change usually do not exhibit such a redundancy property.
For instance the sensory change produced by an object changing color cannot
be equivalently generated by the agent sending a motor command3. Conversely
the sensory change induced by the agent changing the sensitivity of one of its
sensors cannot be equivalently generated by the environment. The sensory re-
dundancy that an agent can internally discover thus seems to correspond to what
an external observer would characterize as the spatiality of changes in the agent-
environment system. Moreover this concept of redundancy naturally accounts
for space being experienced as shared between the agent and the environment,
as both of them play a symmetrical role in the sensory redundancy. In addition
it accounts for space being subjectively content-independent since redundant
sensory changes remain redundant independently of the objects present in the
environment. Finally it also explains the subjective isotropy of space, as equiv-
alent redundant sensory changes can be experienced regardless of the agent’s
and object’s positions and orientations.
The insight proposed by Poincare´ was not focused on the concept of redun-
dancy but on its corollary, the concept of compensability. Because there exists
a set of redundant sensory variations that can be generated both by the agent
or its environment, there is the possibility for one of them to compensate for
the (spatial) sensory variations of the other. As an example, the redundant
sensory change produced by the displacement of an object in the environment
can be compensated, or canceled out, by the same displacement of the agent,
and vice versa (see Fig.3). As the relative positions of the agent and the object
are identical before and after the two displacements, so is the agent’s sensory
input. Interestingly this ability to compensate for spatial changes in the envi-
ronment suggests that the agent could have an active role in the discovery of
3This is true for the kind of motor capacities that biological and robotic systems usually
have. The possibility of more exotic actions will be considered and discussed in Sec. 5.
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Figure 3: Due to the sensory equivalence of displacements of the agent and of the environ-
ment, it is possible for one of them to compensate for the other. By undergoing the same
displacement as the environment (a), the agent can cancel out the resulting sensory change
(b), and vice versa.
space. Instead of merely observing sensorimotor changes in the hope of detecting
redundancy, the agent could be inclined to compensate them. A fundamental
drive for such a behavior could be the necessity for the naive agent to control
its sensorimotor experience, an endeavor in which discovering sensory changes
that can be compensated at will is valuable. Space would thus correspond to
the general structure underlying redundant/compensable sensory experiences.
2.2. Formalization
In this section we propose a mathematical formalism to describe the senso-
rimotor experience of an agent and its relation with the environment. In partic-
ular the concept of point of view, proposed in previous work [21], is recalled and
its limitations with regards to spatial knowledge are highlighted. Redundant
sensory changes are then defined and their relation with compensable sensory
changes made explicit.
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2.2.1. The sensorimotor experience:
In this work we consider so called ”naive” agents which are connected to
an unknown body and immersed in a world they have no a priori knowledge
about. They only have access to raw sensory and motor information. Although
this distinction between the sensory and motor flows might seem artificial in a
holistic description of the agent, it reflects the fundamental distinction between
what the agent does not directly control (the sensory flow it receives) and what
it does (the motor flow it generates). At any moment we assume that the agent’s
sensory and motor states can be respectively described by vectors s and m in
the corresponding linear spaces S = RR and M = RN . Although the nature
and properties of the sensors and motors associated with this sensorimotor ex-
perience do not need to be specified, the sensorimotor experience is assumed
to comply with some assumptions. First we consider that the sensory state
only carries exteroceptive information. Proprioceptive information is supposed
redundant with the motor state and is ignored in the following developments.
Second we assume as a first approximation that the system’s dynamic can be
ignored. The agent’s actuators are thus instantaneously controlled in position
via the motor state, while its sensors generate the sensory state without any
transient phase.
Note that this formalism does not exclude the possibility of a pre-processing
of sensory inputs or post-processing of motor outputs. The sensory state s
could potentially correspond to the output of some module(s) processing the
raw inputs from the sensors. Similarly the motor state m could potentially feed
some module(s) which generates the actual commands sent to the actuators. If
these modules cannot be directly controlled in any way by the agent, they are
transparent to it and are considered part of its unknown body, or more globally
part of the unknown world it interacts with. As a result our approach does not
require unprocessed data and is not in conflict with the fact that evolution most
probably endowed our brains with hardwired pre- and post-processing modules.
Furthermore our approach aspires to be code-independent. It should thus be
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robust to any data transformation that does not destroy the information the
agent needs to capture.
The agent’s sensorimotor experience does not provide a complete picture of
the agent-environment system. We consider a subset of all possible environments
which we assume can be parametrized by vectors e of a vector space E = RP .
This space of environmental states is of course different from the space in which
the agent-environment system is embedded and that we seek to characterize.
For instance, if the only degree of freedom of the environment corresponds to
an object swapping between 4 colors, then the environmental space E would
be a discrete set of 4 states. Although the naive agent does not have directly
access to it, the environmental state e influences its sensorimotor experience. It
shapes the mapping between the motor state m and the associated sensory state
s. Using the notation introduced in [36], we denote φ this mapping parametrized
by e:
s = φe(m). (1)
This mapping captures the structure that the world induces in the sensorimotor
experience. Along with the parameter e, the mapping φ embodies everything it
would be useful for the agent to know about the world, the properties of its envi-
ronment, and the properties of its body. In particular the mapping must contain
information about the existence and the structure of space. Nevertheless, with
only access to m and s, the agent can only probe φe via its sensorimotor flow.
It has to ground properties of the world in its own sensorimotor experience.
2.2.2. Points of view:
We argue that the concept of space emerges through the discovery of spe-
cific sensorimotor invariants. In previous work the concept of point of view was
introduced as a proto-concept of spatial configuration by capturing a certain
basic sensorimotor invariant [21]. This invariant corresponds to the sensory in-
variance induced by redundancy in the mechanical structure of the agent (see
Fig. 4). Indeed different motor states can sometimes lead to the same effective
configuration of the agent relative to the environment, and thus to the same
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Figure 4: (a) A point of view corresponds externally to a configuration of the agent relative
to its environment, and internally to a set of motor states that always generate equivalent
sensory states. Nonetheless a point of view is not equivalent to a spatial configuration as it
captures every degree of freedom of the agent, regardless of its spatial or non-spatial nature.
Both a spatial change, as illustrated in (b), or a non-spatial change, like the change in sensor
structure illustrated in (c), lead to a different point of view. In (c), the agent interprets its
experience as a new point of view despite the fact that its sensor’s spatial configuration has
not changed compared to (a).
sensory state. Moreover this equivalence of the motor states remains true re-
gardless of the state of the environment. Formally we associate to each motor
state mi a point of view, denotedMi, defined as the set of all motor states mj
that generate the same sensory states as mi for any state of the environment e:
Mi =
{
mj such that φe(mj) = φe(mi) for all e
}
. (2)
Note that we assume here that the same motor states are possible for any state
of the environment. Following Eq. (2) we propose to extend the definition of
the mapping φ so that it applies to points of view:
s = φe(M), where s = φe(m) for all m ∈M. (3)
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For an external observer, different setsM correspond to different configurations
the agent’s sensors can have relative to the environment, hence the name point
of view (see [21] for a more detailed discussion). Nonetheless there exist excep-
tional situations in which the sensory equivalence captured by points of view
could also be due to symmetries in the world or limits in the agent’s sensory
capabilities. An extreme example would be a half-empty world in which half of
the motor states would be associated with the same sensory state. This peculiar
property of the world would be invisible to the agent, since it would interpret
it as just another particular point of view.
For the agent, identifying points of view is interesting on two levels. First it
supports a more compact encoding of the agent’s experience in which knowing
the current point of viewMi instead of the particular motor state mi is sufficient
to describe the sensorimotor experience. Second the knowledge of these sets has
the advantage that it allows the agent to predict in advance the sensory state
s associated with all motor states mj ∈ Mi from the experience in mi. These
two mechanisms fit well with the type of fundamental drives which have been
typically proposed in the literature on unsupervised learning [1, 7, 43].
As displayed in Eq. (2), points of view have the interesting property of
being independent from the state of the environment, despite being derived from
sensorimotor experiences which depend on it. Indeed e influences the sensory
state s but not the motor space in which the setsM are defined. This property
echoes the subjectively experienced content-independence of space. It suggests
that the notion of space should fundamentally be anchored in the agent’s motor
space. Nonetheless points of view are not a direct internal representation of
the agent’s spatial configuration. Indeed they capture all the agent’s effective
degrees of freedom, which are not all necessarily spatial. As an example, imagine
an agent which can control the spatial configuration of its sensors as well as some
other non-spatial parameter of the sensors, like their sensitivity. Any change
in this non-spatial parameter leads to a different sensory state and thus to
a different point of view M, when no spatial change actually occurred for the
agent. An illustration of this limitation is proposed in Fig. 4(a)(c) with an agent
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that can change the strucutre of its sensor array. The concept of point of view
is thus insufficient to internally characterize the agent’s spatial configuration
independently from its other potential degrees of freedom. However we propose
to use this compact representation of the motor experience in later developments
to get rid of the agent’s mechanical redundancy.
2.2.3. Agent-environment redundancy:
By observing the influence of the motor state on the sensory state, we have
shown how a naive agent can detect a simple form of redundancy which can be
captured in the form of points of view. Points of view internally represent the
agent’s external configuration, including both spatial and non-spatial parame-
ters. In order to isolate the spatial component of this configuration we claim
that the agent can detect a more sophisticated form of sensory redundancy.
As described in 2.1 it consists in a redundancy between how either the agent’s
motor state or the environmental state can change the agent’s sensory state.
By identifying such redundant changes, the agent should be able to distinguish
which points of view are related through spatial transformations and which are
not.
Let us consider a reference state of the agent-environment system denoted
(e0,m0 ∈M0). Given its dual nature, the system can undergo changes from two
sources: the motor state and the environmental state. In the first case we denote
by ma the motor state after a change m0 →ma, andMa its associated point of
view after the corresponding change M0 →Ma. For the sake of simplicity we
drop hereinafter the notation based on the motor state in favor of the one based
on the point of view, without any loss of generality (see Eq (2)). In the second
case we denote by eb the environmental state after a change e0 → eb. According
to Eq. (1), these state changes in the system generate sensory changes. Let sa
denote the sensory state associated with the configuration (e0,Ma) after the
motor change:
s0 = φe0(M0)→ sa = φe0(Ma). (4)
Similarly, let sb denote the sensory state associated with the configuration
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(eb,M0) after the environmental change:
s0 = φe0(M0)→ sb = φeb(M0). (5)
The redundancy we are interested in corresponds to sensory changes which can
be generated both by a motor change or an environmental change (see Fig. 2).
Formally we’re looking for states Ma and eb such that:
sa = sb ⇐⇒ φe0(Ma) = φeb(M0). (6)
According to the line of argumentation of section 2.1, this sensory equivalence
should be due to the spatial nature of the changes M0 → Ma and e0 →
eb. However it could also theoretically be due to some specific invariance in
particular environments. Indeed one could imagine a particular environment for
whichM0 →Ma is not a spatial change but still has a sensory-wise equivalent
e0 → eb. As spatial changes, or more generally the structure of space, should
be common to all possible environmental states, we rule out these outliers by
looking for points of viewM∗a for which an equivalent environmental state exists
for any initial state e0 of the environment:
For all e0, there exists eb such that: φe0(M∗a) = φeb(M0). (7)
The set of all M∗a corresponds to all points of view related to M0 by a motor
change which has a sensory-equivalent environmental change, regardless of the
initial state of the environment. We denote it
{M∗}
0
and claim that it internally
represents all the agent’s motor configuration which are related toM0 through
spatial transformations.
2.2.4. From redundancy to compensability:
As noted in section 2.1, H.Poincare´ suggested that an naive agent can ac-
tively acquire spatial knowledge by discovering compensable sensory changes.
This concept of compensability is directly related to the one of redundancy in-
troduced in the previous section. Intuitively, it corresponds to the fact that if
there exists a motor change which compensates for the sensory change induced
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by an environment change, then this motor change is itself redundant with the
opposite environmental change. By compensating for sensory changes gener-
ated by the environment, the agent can thus discover motor changes which are
redundant with environmental changes, i.e. displacements. An illustration of
the phenomenon is presented in Fig. 3.
More formally, let (e0,M0) be the reference state of the agent-environment
system, (eb,M0) the state of the system after a change e0 → eb, and sb its
associated sensory state. Let us now assume that the agent can find a point of
view Ma which compensates for the experienced sensory change for any initial
state of the environment e0, i.e.:
φeb(Ma) = φe0(M0). (8)
According to Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) if we consider eb as the initial state of the
environment, making (eb,M0) the new reference state of the system, then:
Ma ∈
{M∗}
0
. (9)
This means that the change of point of view M0 → Ma compensates for the
change e0 → eb and is sensory-redundant with the opposite change eb → e0
(see Fig. 3). Consequently the agent can actively discover the spatially related
points of view of
{M∗}
0
by trying to compensate for the sensory changes its
environment generates.
Before introducing the simulated system that will be used to illustrate the
approach, let us summarize how space manifests itself in a naive agent’s ex-
perience. While exploring the world, a naive agent can notice some simple
invariants in its otherwise uninterpreted sensorimotor experience. For the sake
of clarity we distinguished two kinds of such invariants, although they could
both be captured by the agent at the same time during exploration. The first
kind of invariant has been called point of view and corresponds to the sets
of motor states that are redundant in the sense that they provoke equivalent
sensory states. These points of view internally characterize the agent’s body
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configuration in the world, but capture both spatial and non-spatial aspects of
this configuration. The second kind of invariant corresponds to the equivalence
between certain sensory changes due to the environment (the agent does not
act) and certain sensory changes due to the agent’s motor changes. It can be
seen as a redundancy not in the agent’s body but between the agent’s motor
state and the state of the environment. An agent can actively discover this
redundancy by compensating for the sensory changes it passively experiences.
Using our usual spatial language, we refer to these redundant changes as dis-
placements, and claim that they are the foundation of the agent’s concept of
space. This discovery of spatial knowledge could be based on a fundamental
but simple drive for the agent to control its sensorimotor experience. Indeed it
is very noteworthy and useful for an naive agent to discover invariants, which
later allow it to predict the sensory outcome of some of its actions. Moreover,
because these specific space-related invariants are independent of the content of
space, they provide a useful generalization capacity to the agent.
2.3. Simulated agent-object system
A simple simulated agent-environment system will be used in the following
sections to illustrate how the topology and metric structure of space are accessi-
ble in a naive agent’s sensorimotor experience. The system, illustrated in Fig.5,
consists in a robotic arm moving in the plane and observing an object. It is
complex enough to avoid any trivial outcome of the simulation, while simple
enough to ensure an intuitive analysis and visualization of the results.
The agent: The agent consists in a three-segment serial arm with a static
base and a rotary sensor at its end-tip. Each of the three segments is of unitary
length. The relative orientations in radians of its K = 4 joints are controlled by
the four elements m(k) of its motor state m = [m(1),m(2),m(3),m(4)]. The
arm tip has 3 degrees of freedom in the plane: two for its position [xtip, ytip]
and one for its orientation αtip. We call this triplet the spatial configuration
of the agent’s sensor. The end-sensor coarsely imitates an eye. It is made
up of a pinhole lens in front of a linear retina covered with 6 light-sensitive
18
Figure 5: Presentation of the simulated system. (a) The agent is a three-segment serial
arm equipped with hinge joints, and an eye-like sensor that it can move in the plane. The
environment consists in an object made up of 10 point light sources that can translate rigidly
in the plane. (b) Light emitted by the object is projected on the sensor’s retina and generates
sensations.
receptors. The position pr of each receptor r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} on the 1-D retina
is randomly drawn at the beginning of the simulation. Each receptor is sensible
to light in the environment. For a single point light source l in the environment,
the output sl(r) generated by the receptor r is defined as:
sl(r) =
e−(pr−pl)
2
dl
, (10)
where pl is the position of the light-source projection on the retina, and dl is
the distance between the center of the lens and the light source l (see Fig. 5).
For L point light sources in the environment, the output s(r) of the receptor r
is the sum of the outputs for each source:
s(r) =
L∑
l=1
sl(r). (11)
Note that given the projective nature of the sensor, any light source behind
the lens is not projected on the retina and does not generate any excitation.
Likewise, in this projective setting it is not relevant to specify the dimensions
of the retina, which can consequently be considered unitary. Finally the agent’s
sensory state is defined as the concatenation of all the receptor outputs: s =
[s(1), . . . , s(6)].
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It is important to highlight that the agent’s structure, motors, and sensor
have been defined arbitrarily. However our approach claims to be generic enough
to lead to qualitatively similar results with a different design of the agent. The
only design limitations are twofold. First the sensor should be rich enough so
that two different configurations of the sensor generate two different sensory
states. Second the agent should have a fixed base in the world. The latter
assumption could however be loosened, as will be discussed in Sec. 5.
The environment as an object: The environment is made up of L = 10 point
light sources randomly distributed around the agent at the beginning of the
simulation. They are considered as part of a single rigid body, or ”object”,
which can translate in the plane. The environmental state e is defined as the
position [xobj , yobj ] of the object’s ”center”, which is arbitrarily set in [0, 0] at
the beginning of the simulation. Note that the object’s center is defined only
for the purpose of describing the simulation. It does not impact in any way the
sensorimotor experience of the agent. In the simulation, environmental changes
ei → ej can be of two kinds. Either the object’s center and all the light sources
undergo a rigid translation in the plane, which corresponds to a spatial change
[∆xobj ,∆yobj ]. Or the lights sources undergo a random redistribution around
the agent, which corresponds to a state change. During such a redistribution,
the center of the object is considered unmoved. The state change can thus be
seen as a change in the nature of the object but not in its position.
Note that the environment could be made more complex. Links between the
different light sources could for instance be defined to explain the rigid struc-
ture of the object. However such an improvement would not alter the agent’s
sensorimotor experience if these links do not emit light. Additionally note that
the light sources have been randomly distributed and do not exhibit any specific
structure. They only comply to the implicit constraint that the environment
should present no symmetry from a sensory perspective. This way, two differ-
ent configurations of the sensor relatively to the environment necessarily lead
to two different sensory states. Finally, although it was considered in [21], we
purposefully excluded the possibility of object rotations during spatial changes.
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There are two reasons for this choice. First, by artificially removing this spatial
degree of freedom, we limit the spatial configuration to be discovered by the
agent to the translations in the plane. This will ensure that we are able to
visualize the internal representation built by the agent. Second, it indirectly
means that rotations of the sensor will eventually be interpreted by the agent as
non-spatial (state changes) because it cannot experience their compensability.
This way, we can illustrate state changes of two different origins in the system:
one from the environment and one from the agent itself.
In the following sections we apply the formalism developed so far to show
how a naive agent can discover the topology of the spatial configuration of its
sensor, as well as the regularity of the spatial metric.
3. Capturing the topological structure of space
We claim that spatial knowledge is fundamentally based on the existence of
sensory-redundancy between some motor changes of an agent and some changes
of its environment. In this section we illustrate, using the system introduced
in 2.3, how an agent can discover such a redundancy while interacting with
its environment, and in particular by trying to compensate for sensory changes
generated by the external world. The structure underlying the redundant ex-
periences of the agent will be captured by building an internal representation
whose topology will be shown to be identical to its sensor’s spatial configura-
tion. First, we introduce a method to estimate the point of view set associated
with any motor configuration of the arm. Based on this proto-spatial concept
we then show how the agent can identify which point of view changes are redun-
dant (compensable) with environmental changes. Finally we propose a method
to let the agent build an internal representation of its spatially related points
of view. Note once again that the focus of this paper is on identifying the sen-
sorimotor structure underlying spatial knowledge and not on finding the best
way to capture this structure. As a consequence the methods introduced below
will sometimes rely on analytic methods to shortcut exploration phases which
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would otherwise require the development of complete machine learning solutions
in themselves.
3.1. Estimating the agent’s points of view
The agent described in Sec. 2.3 is mechanically redundant as it controls
the 3 degrees of freedom of its sensor through 4 motorized hinge joints. This
constitutes an interesting case study in which the motor state is not directly
homeomorphic to the sensor’s spatial configuration. As introduced in [21]
and described in Sec. 2.2.2, the agent’s sensorimotor experience can be rep-
resented more compactly by defining points of view M as sets of motor states
m which generate identical sensory states s for any state of the environment e
(see Eq. (2)). Internally, considering points of view M instead of motor states
m allows a more compact representation of the sensorimotor experience where
equivalent motor states are reduced to a single state. It also saves replicating ex-
ploration of the motor states discovered in one point of view when subsequently
exploring the environment. Externally this allows to describe the relevant pa-
rameters of the agent’s configuration (spatial and non-spatial) while discarding
mechanical redundancy of the body or other potential irrelevant symmetries in
the system. In this section we propose a method to estimate the point of view
associated with any motor configuration of the arm.
The system was designed to exhibit no peculiar symmetry with respect to
the agent’s sensory experience. Consequently the elements m ∈ M of a point
of view can be discovered by exploring a single environmental state e. In a less
favorable scenario, symmetries in the system for some environmental state e
could result in different spatial configurations of the sensor generating the same
sensory state. In such a case exploring multiple environments in which these
symmetries are inconsistent would be required to sort out these ”false positive”
and correctly define each point of view M. Nonetheless if every environmental
state e consistently were to present the same symmetries, this property of the
world would be directly captured in the sets M extended in this way without
affecting the agent’s ability to interact with its environment.
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Figure 6: (a) Visualization of the point of view manifold associated with a random motor
configuration (in blue). Configurations of the arm are shown on the left, and the correspond-
ing motor states on the right. Moving along the looped 1D manifold in the motor space
corresponds to a continuous change of the arm configuration which keeps the retina fixed. (b)
Visualization of the manifolds, on the right, associated with multiple arm configurations, on
the left, such that the retina moves along the x-axis. When the arm’s tip is more than 1 unit
from its base, the points of view correspond to looped 1D manifolds. However when the tip is
closer than 1 unit from the base, the manifold breaks into two disconnected submanifolds, due
to the mechanical constraints of the arm (red and orange). An arm configuration belonging
to both those submanifolds and producing the same spatial configuration of the sensor are
shown on the left (in red and orange).
Because each set M is potentially infinite in the case of continuous mo-
tor commands, we propose to approximate it by a finite number N = 100 of
motor states m ∈ M. The search for these samples could be performed by ex-
haustively (and/or randomly) exploring the motor space M and tracking which
motor states generate the same sensory input. Other approaches could also be
proposed like for instance the use of a neural network to directly build an inter-
nal space of points of view by capturing the topology of the sensory space(s) (see
previous work [19]). Although these options are more realistic in terms of data
accessible to the naive agent, we propose instead to use an analytic approach
for the sake of computational efficiency. It makes use of the arm’s Jacobian
23
and of its kernel to sample the subspace associated with M. More precisely,
given the mechanical structure of the arm, the hinge nature of its joints, and
their continuous control law, each point of view M corresponds in the simu-
lated system to a closed 1-D manifold in the 4-D motor space M (see Fig. 6(a)).
Starting from a motor state mi, we thus propose to sample states mj ∈Mi by
iteratively moving along this 1-D manifold with a small step ε until the initial
motor state is reached again. The direction of each step in the motor space is
given by the kernel of the arm’s Jacobian ker
(
Jf (mj)
)
which corresponds to a
vector pointing in the direction along which local motor changes do not generate
sensory changes:
ker
(
Jf (mj)
)
= ker
(
∂f
∂m
∣∣∣∣
mj
)
, (12)
where f is the forward kinematic model:
f : m 7−→ (xtip, ytip, αtip). (13)
Starting from mj = mi, new samples are thus generated iteratively as follows:
mj+1 = mj + γε
ker
(
Jf (mj)
)
‖ ker (Jf (mj))‖ , (14)
where ε = 10−3 is the step size, and γ = ±1 is a parameter to ensure the
successive steps consistently move in the same direction along the manifold (the
kernel only defines the vector orientation). Note that the vector added to mj
is never of zero magnitude as there is no degeneration in the arm’s kinematics.
The sampling stops once at least 50 motor states have been collected and the
last sample mj lies at a distance less than 10
−2 from the initial motor state mi.
Finally N = 100 samples regularly distributed along the manifold are defined
by interpolation over all the collected samples. These final samples are the only
ones stored by the agent in order to limit memory usage during the simulation.
A more complete description of the sampling method is available in [21].
Note that this sampling method induces a constraint on the range of points of
view that can be estimated. Indeed it cannot sample setsM which are made of
two disjoint subsets. This peculiar situation happens for any arm configuration
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such that the distance between the tip and the base is less than the length of its
segments (see Fig.6(b)). Consequently these configurations are ignored during
the simulation, which leaves a hole in the center of the arm’s effective working
space. This limitation is to be attributed to the analytic sampling method
we proposed and not to the more general approach. Other methods could be
implemented to discover the two disjoint subsets.
3.2. Estimating spatially related points of view
The set of all points of view that an agent can estimate captures the variabil-
ity of its sensor’s external configuration. Yet not all changes between points of
view are necessarily spatial. In this simulation we are interested in identifying
the set
{M∗}
0
all points of view which are spatially related to a configuration
m0 ∈M0 the agent is initially in. This means that we look for all points of view
related toM0 through sensory changes redundant with environmental changes.
Given the continuous nature of the agent’s motor experience, the set
{M∗}
0
is potentially infinite. We thus propose to approximate it by a finite number
of points of view Mi. As described in 2.2.4, the agent can actively identify
points of view Mi ∈
{M∗}
0
by trying to compensate for sensory changes gen-
erated by the environment. We propose to take advantage of this mechanism
by introducing a tracking-like behavior for the agent. Starting from a random
configuration of the system (e0,M0), the exploration phase of the simulation
consists in successively changing the environmental state and letting the agent
try to compensate for the resulting sensory changes. Each environmental change
ei → ei+1 is either a spatial change (translation of the object) or a non-spatial
change (change of the object structure). In either case it generates a sensory
change si → si+1 that the agent then tries to compensate for. It does so by
searching for a new configuration mi+1 ∈Mi+1 such that the sensory variation
is canceled out and the final sensory state is again si (see Fig. 3). Note that the
environment is considered static during this search. If the agent finds such a
motor state mi+1, the associated point of viewMi+1 is estimated (see Sec 3.1)
and considered a sample of
{M∗}
0
. If not, the experience is discarded, the arm
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resumes its previous motor configuration mi+1 = mi, and waits for the next
environmental change. From an external perspective, the agent should be able
to compensate for sensory changes which are generated by a spatial changes of
the object. On the contrary, it should not be able to find a compensating motor
configuration when the environmental change is non-spatial. Additionally any
displacements of the object which would require the sensor to move out of the
arm’s working space should also be discarded due to non-compensability.
Compensation: The search for compensating motor states mi+1 ∈ Mi+1
could be done by exhaustively exploring the motor space M or taking advantage
of a tracking-like heuristic. Instead we propose an analytic approach for the sake
of computational efficiency. The method relies on the arm’s kinematic model f
of Eq. (13), as well as the desired sensor configuration required to compensate
for a displacement of the object’s center [∆xobj ,∆yobj ]:
[xtipi+1, y
tip
i+1, α
tip
i+1] = [x
tip
i , y
tip
i , α
tip
i ] + [∆x
obj ,∆yobj , 0]. (15)
The displacement of the object is null in the case of a non-spatial change. The
method consists in searching a minimum for the function
|| f(m)− [xtipi+1, ytipi+1, αtipi+1] ||2 (16)
through a conventional minimum search method (Nelder-Mead simplex algo-
rithm). If the minimized error is less than a threshold ξ = 10−3, the corre-
sponding motor state mi+1 is considered to compensate for the environmental
change. Otherwise the sensory experience is discarded.
Object displacements: During the simulation any translation of the object
could be considered. However we propose to constrain them to a regular grid of
positions in order to allow an intuitive interpretation of the simulation results.
As illustrated in Fig. 7(a), the grid is made of 622 regularly distributed positions
centered on [0, 0]. The width and height of the grid is set to 12 units, which en-
sures that the whole agent’s working space can be covered by the compensatory
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arm displacements4 regardless of its initial motor configuration m0. During the
exploration phase, the object is successively moved into each position in the grid,
in no particular order. Between two such displacements it can also undergo a
non-spatial change with a probability of 10% by redistributing the light sources.
Results: Figure 7 present the motor configurations mi obtained by compen-
sation of the object displacements and the corresponding external arm configu-
rations for a given random initial motor configuration m0 = [0.1,−1.5, 2.2,−3].
Over the 642 positions taken by the object during the exploration phase, 648 led
to a compensation experience. The others were discarded because the search
method was unable to converge to a satisfying solution. The found motor con-
figurations are such that the end-tip sensor regularly covers the planar working
space of the agent while maintaining a constant orientation. This seems to in-
dicate that the agent successfully identified translations of its sensor as spatial
changes, while rotations of its sensor are not considered spatial due to a de-
liberate lack of compensability in the simulation. Note that a position lying
inside the working space has also been falsely identified as non-spatial due to a
non-convergence of the search method (see red outlined position in Fig. 7(a)).
Finally Fig. 7 also presents the estimated points of view sets Mi ∈
{M∗}
0
associated with the motor states mi discovered by compensation during the ex-
ploration. These estimated manifolds represent the internal structure that was
actually captured by the agent in its motor space.
3.3. Building a topological representation of spatial configuration
As can be observed in Fig 7(d), the spatially related manifoldsMi ∈
{M∗}
0
seem to exhibit an underlying topological structure in the motor space. Given
the continuous nature of the arm’s forward model, we indeed expect the set{M∗}
0
to define a manifold. Moreover we expect this manifold to be homeomor-
phic to the space of the sensor’s position [xtip, ytip]. We propose to capture its
4The arm’s maximum reach is 3 units long, which means that its working space has a
maximum diameter of 6 units. This is the distance the grid must then cover in every direction.
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Figure 7: (a) The initial arm configuration, and the grid of positions taken by the object
during the simulation. The arm’s working space is shown in green, and the positions of the
object for which the agent was able to compensate the associated sensory change are displayed
in blue. They are shifted to the left relatively to the working space because the initial position
of the sensor lies on the right of the arm’s base. One object position is outlined in red. It
correspond to a theoretically compensable object displacement for which the search method
did not converge. (b) All the arm configurations found by compensating for the successive
sensory variations generated by the object. The configurations are colored according to the
angle the arm tip makes with the x-axis. (c) All the motor states found by compensation and
corresponding to the arm configurations of the previous panel. The initial motor state of the
agent is displayed in bold black. (d) All the estimated point of view sets associated with the
compensating motor states of the previous panel.
28
topology in a low-dimensional representation of the points of viewMi ∈
{M∗}
0
.
In contrast with previous work where the topology of the set of all points of view
was estimated [21], we aim here at capturing the topology of spatially related
points of view only. The final internal representation built by the agent should
thus be a representation of the sensor’s spatial configuration.
A simple way to define a topology is to introduce a metric on the con-
sidered set
{M∗}
0
. This metric will also be used to project the data into a
low-dimension representational space . We propose to use the Hausdorff metric
to define a distance dM(., .) for each pair in
{M∗}
0
. The Hausdorff distance
is the greatest of all the distances from a point in one set to the closest point
in the other set. The distance between two points of view is thus defined as
follows:
dM(Mi,Mj) = max
{
sup
ma∈Mi
inf
mb∈Mj
dm(ma,mb) ,
sup
mb∈Mj
inf
ma∈Mi
dm(ma,mb)
}
,
(17)
with dm the metric defined in the motor space M. The latter is the natural Eu-
clidean metric but slightly modified to take into account the periodicity induced
by the arm’s hinge joints. Indeed the physical structure of the arm implies that
the agent’s experience is invariant modulo 2pi on any of its motor. The metric
between two motor states in the motor space is thus defined as follows:
dm(ma,mb) =
√√√√ K∑
k=1
arccos
(
cos
(
ma(k)−mb(k)
))2
, (18)
where m(k) is the k-th element of the vector m. This motor metric ensures that
the distance between two elements m(k) of two motor states is not greater than
pi, which means that the distance dm(ma,mb) between two motor states is not
greater than 2pi for K = 4. Although we impose this periodicity property in the
motor metric, the agent could also potentially discover it, since the periodicity
induced by the arm’s hinge joints implies an equivalent sensory periodicity.
Finally note that the metric we define on the set
{M∗}
0
is derived from the
motor space and has nothing to do with the external metric which applies to
the sensor’s spatial configuration.
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The metric dM is applied to compute distances between all pairs in
{M∗}
0
.
These distances enable the use of a dimension reduction method to build a low-
dimensional representation of the set. We chose the Curvilinear Component
Analysis (CCA) method to perform the projection [5]. Like its famous couter-
part Isomap [47], CCA is a non-linear projection method, except that it does
not rely on the assumption that the manifold underlying the data is developable
[24]. To preserve the data topology during the projection, CCA preserves small
pairwise distances while allowing long range distortions (unfolding). For the
sake of visualization we arbitrarily project the data into two separate 2D and
3D representational spaces. This manual tuning of CCA’s output dimension
could potentially be replaced by a data-driven estimation of the manifold in-
trinsic dimension [18].
Results: Figure 8 presents the projection of the set
{M∗}
0
in 2D and 3D.
It appears that the manifold underlying the data has an intrinsic dimension of
2. Nonetheless it is highly curved, as revealed by its 3D projection, and CCA
has been unable to unfold it in 2D without a cut (see Fig. 8(a)). This result is
however consistent with the experiences collected by the agent during the ex-
ploration phase. It did indeed translate its sensor in a plane to compensate for
the object’s displacements, which effectively corresponds to a two-dimensional
manifold. Moreover the consistent color code used in the figures show that the
topology of this external plane has been correctly captured by the agent. The
whole agent’s working space and the neighborhood relations of the sensor spa-
tial configurations are correctly represented (this is true for the 3D projection,
and for the 2D projection if we omit the cut induced by CCA to flatten the
manifold). The internal representation built by the agent based on its own sen-
sorimotor experience is thus a suitable topological representation of the spatial
configuration of its sensor. An element-wise comparison of the distances between
the points of view in the external Euclidean metric and the Hausdorff metric
derived from the motor space is proposed in Fig.16(a). The same comparison
between the Hausdorff metric and the low-dimensional metric after projection in
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Figure 8: Projections of the points of view M ∈ {M∗}
0
in 2D (a) and 3D (b), using the
same color code as in Fig.7. The underlying manifold of points of view appears to have a 2D
cylindrical structure. Its curvature is too strong for CCA to project it in 2D without a cut
(red dashed lines).
2D/3D is also presented in Fig.16. They show that the metric estimated by the
agent differs from the external metric and that the low-dimensional projections
further distort it (see Fig.16(b)).
4. Capturing the regularity of the spatial metric
By experiencing compensable sensory changes, a naive agent can discover
motor changes which are redundant with environmental changes from a sen-
sory perspective. These noteworthy experiences exhibit an underlying structure
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Figure 9: Illustration of the metric difference between the external grid of sensor positions
(a), and its internal representations in 2D (b) and 3D (c). All red (resp. blue) transitions
in the grid correspond to equivalent external vertical (resp. horizontal) displacements, and
thus have the same magnitude. However they are internally represented by vectors or various
magnitude. Note that abnormally large vectors in (b) are due to the manifold being cut during
the projection in 2D.
homeomorphic to the agent’s spatial configurations. As presented in previous
section in the case of a simple simulated arm, this structure can be captured
explicitly in an internal representation whose topology is identical to the one of
the external space the agent is moving in. Yet the metric of the internal repre-
sentation noticeably differs from the one of the external space, as revealed by
the shape of the projected manifold in Fig. 8. The data cloud appears there as
a tube instead of a flat surface that would correspond to the shape of the actual
grid of positions the sensor has been in during the simulation (see Fig. 7(a)).
This difference is expected as the agent does not have direct access to the ex-
ternal Euclidean metric. The internal representation is instead derived from
the motor metric. This results in two equivalent displacements in the external
space to be represented internally by two vectors of different magnitude and
orientation, as illustrated in Fig. 9.
However we claim that a naive agent can discover the metric regularity of
the external space and modify its internal metric accordingly. This can be done
through the discovery of new invariants accessible through a more sophisticated
exploration of the environment. In this section we describe this exploration
strategy and how the metric regularity manifests itself in the agent’s sensorimo-
tor experience using the same simulated system as before. We then propose a
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method to modify the internal metric estimated by the agent and consequently
its whole internal representation. Finally we analyze the resulting final represen-
tation of the sensor’s spatial configuration and evaluate it on a simple reaching
task.
4.1. Discovering the spatial metric regularity
We subjectively experience space as homogeneous or isotropic: the length of
an object does not change depending on the point of view of the observer. For
instance the distance between the two ends of a rigid stick is constant, regardless
of where it is positioned in our field of view. This metric invariance is of course
not to be mistaken with the stick appearance which does vary depending on our
point of view (for example it grows smaller with distance). This metric regularity
is so far not captured in the internal representation built by the agent. Let us
imagine a stick of length equal to the distance between two positions in the
external grid of object positions. Moving from one end of the stick to the other
always requires a displacement of the same magnitude, regardless of where the
stick is placed in the working space. On the contrary, the projection of these
displacements in the internal representation leads to changes of different length
depending on the position of the stick (see Fig. 9).
In order to capture the external metric regularity, the agent has to discover
that different point of view changesMi →Mi′ correspond to equivalent exter-
nal displacements. This can be achieved by building on the already acquired
sensorimotor knowledge and performing an exploration inspired by the invari-
ance that was just illustrated with the stick example. However the nature and
length of a specific object, like a stick, is not an information directly accessible
to the agent. Instead we thus consider displacements of objects as a ”measur-
ing rod” in the external space. The rationale behind this choice is once again
that an agent should discover the properties of space through the displacements
it allows. This way compensability can be used to characterize these sensori-
motor experiences and modify the agent’s internal representation accordingly,
regardless of the specific content of space.
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Figure 10: (a) A single environmental change (here ei → ei+1) can be compensated from mul-
tiple initial motor states (here mij and mij′ ). This way, the agent can infer that the different
corresponding motor changes (here mij → mi+1j and mij′ → mi+1j′ ) compensate for the
same external displacement, and should thus be of equal magnitude. (b) If the environmental
displacement corresponds to the displacement between the initial motor states, then some new
motor states found by compensation actually correspond to some initial motor states already
stored in memory. Here the motor state mi+1j found by compensation corresponds to the
initial motor state mij′ (see the arm configuration in red). Motor states m have been used
in this illustration for the sake of simplicity, but the same rationale can be applied to points
of view M.
We propose a more sophisticated way for the agent to explore its environ-
ment. It is similar to the one introduced in the previous simulation (see Sec. 3.2)
except that multiple points of viewMij are considered at each step of the sim-
ulation instead of a singleMi. Its principle is illustrated in Fig. 10(a). Initially
the agent observes an object, in the envionmental state e0, from different points
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of view denoted M0j , respectively generating sensory states s0j , where index
j ∈ {1, . . . , J} denotes the point of view. Similarly to the previous simulation,
we then let the environmental state iteratively change ei → ei+1 via either spa-
tial or non-spatial transformations. This results in sensory changes sij → si+1j
associated with each point of view j. The agent can try to compensate each of
them by finding a point of view Mi+1j which cancels out the sensory change
and generates sij again. For each point of view j, if the environmental change is
compensable, the agent can find such a suitableMi+1j . Interestingly all the in-
ternal changesMij →Mi+1j correspond to a single change in the environment.
This is equivalent to exploring the same stick from different starting points of
view. They should thus all have the same magnitude in the internal metric and
comply to the following constraint:
∀(j, j′) ∈ {1, . . . , J} , d̂M(Mij ,Mi+1j ) = d̂M(Mij′ ,Mi+1j′ ). (19)
where d̂ denotes the desired modified metric. From an external perspective,
the exploration phase would look like the agent first observes the environment
from different points of view, then experiences the environment moving, and
tries to find new motor configurations which ensure the same set of relative po-
sitions with the environment. It is analogous to a multi-point-of-view tracking
behavior. Note that we assume here that the environment does not move while
the agent searches for the multiple compensating points of view. When the
environmental change is a state change, the agent cannot find suitable points
of view Mi+1j to compensate for the associated sensory change. In this case
the experience is discarded, the agent resumes its previous configurations Mij
and waits for the next environmental change. For some j, non-compensability
can also occur for some spatial environmental changes which would require the
sensor to move out of the agent’s working space. In those cases, the experience
is discarded like in the case of state changes.
Optimized simulation setting: The exploration strategy we just proposed has
been described in a generic form. For instance the different initial points of view
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Figure 11: Three examples of sets of point of view changes Mij → Mi+1j associated with
three environmental displacements. They are shows in the external space, where they corre-
spond to identical displacements, and in the 2D and 3D representational spaces, where they
correspond to changes of various magnitudes.
M0j can be taken anywhere in the space of points of view. This means that they
are not necessarily related through spatial changes and do not necessarily belong
to a unique set
{M∗}. In the simulated system where rotations are considered
state changes, this would correspond to points of view M0j associated with
different orientations of the sensor. Similarly, any spatial environmental changes
ei → ei+1 can be considered during the exploration. This means that the new
points of view Mi+1j found by compensation can lie anywhere in the space
of points of view and do not necessarily correspond to points of view that the
agent already explored. Although the approach we described to discover metric
regularity applies to such generic cases, we propose to carefully select the initial
36
points of view M0j and the spatial changes ei → ei+1 in order to limit the
computational cost of this second simulation. The goal is to consider the points
of view Mi ∈
{M∗}
0
estimated in the previous simulation as a given and to
ensure that no new point of view needs to be created and stored in memory.
This is done by taking already known points of view as initial points of view,
M0j =Mi ∈
{M∗}
0
,
and by taking all possible displacements in the grid of positions already explored
in 3.2 as spatial changes ei → ei+1. This way all initial points of view M0j ,
and consequently all the potentialMi+1j found by compensation, belong to the
same set
{M∗}
0
. The simulation thus focuses on a single manifold
{M∗} and
how capturing metric regularity changes its structure. Moreover by considering
displacements of the objects inside the grid of positions that originally generated
the points of view Mi ∈
{M∗}
0
(and thus the points of view M0j ), we ensure
that any new Mi+1j found by compensation actually corresponds to an initial
point of view (see Fig. 10(b)):
for all (i, j), there exists j′ ∈ {1, . . . , J} such that: Mi+1j =M0′j . (20)
This way no new point of view needs to be estimated and stored in memory
during the whole simulation. The internal modification required to capture reg-
ularity can then be done directly on the already estimated metric dM(Mi,Mi′),
∀(Mi,Mi′) ∈
{M∗}
0
.
In the simulation all possible translations of the object in the grid of posi-
tions are experienced by the agent, in no particular order, which ensures that
each internal distance dM(Mi,Mi′),∀(Mi,Mi′) ∈
{M∗}
0
is taken into ac-
count during the metric regularization process. Like in previous simulation, we
opted for an analytical solution in order to bypass a computationally expensive
exploration of the agent. For any point of view Mij and environmental change
ei → ei+1, the compensating point of viewMi+1j is estimated by looking for the
point of view in
{M∗}
0
which generates the same displacement [∆xobj ,∆yobj , 0]
of the sensor (see Eq. (15)).
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4.2. Modifying the internal metric
Following the exploration strategy we just described, for all i the agent is
able to discover sets of J points of view changes Mij → Mi+1j associated
with the same external change ei → ei+15. Yet they correspond to different
distances dM(Mij ,Mi+1−j) in the internal metric estimated by the agent. This
phenomenon is illustrated in Fig. 11 for three different displacements of the
object. We thus propose to modify this internal metric to comply with the
equality constraints inferred from the agent’s sensorimotor exploration. The
target metric d̂M(Mij ,Mi+1j ) after regularization should be such that:
d̂M(Mij ,Mi+1j ) = Di,i+1 , for all j (21)
where Di,i+1 is a distance shared by all point of view changes associated with
the environmental change ei → ei+1. Yet the equality constraints discovered
by the agent during the exploration do not define the value of Di,i+1. We thus
propose to derive it from the existing metric defined in the motor space during
previous simulation. The distance Di,i+1 is set to be equal to the average of the
set of distances it is associated with:
Di,i+1 =
〈
dM(Mij ,Mi+1j )
〉
j
, (22)
where 〈.〉 denotes the average operator.
Iterative unfolding procedure: The regularization method described in Eq. (21)
and (22) does not necessarily lead to a consistent (low-dimensional) metric. In-
deed there is no interplay between the different values Di,i+1 associated with
different displacements. Consequently two object displacements with a ratio of
2:1 in magnitude are not necessarily associated with internal distances Di,i+1
respecting the same ratio. In order to enforce consistency in the modified met-
ric, we project it in low dimension, the same way the initial metric was pro-
jected in Sec. 3.3. Forcing the data to lie in a low dimensional space further
5In practice, given the limits of the arm’s working space, less than J points of view changes
are discovered for each i.
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Figure 12: Projections of the points of view in 2D and 3D after the first and last iterations of
internal metric regularization. A small distortion of the metric in 2D is visible after the first
iteration, but disappears after 10 iterations. A large distortion of the metric in 3D is visible
after the first iteration. After 10 iterations, the metric appears regular but the manifold still
displays a global curvature. For the sake of visualization, the missing configuration of Fig. 7(a)
is displayed in red.
alters the internal metric by having the different distances dM(Mi,Mi′), for all
(Mi,Mi′) ∈
{M∗}
0
, interact when positioning each projected data point Mi.
The metric obtained after projection is then considered the new internal metric
between the points of view estimated by the agent.
The whole process of assessing the values Di,i+1, modifying the internal dis-
tances dM(Mij ,Mi+1j ), and projecting the resulting metric in low dimension is
repeated 10 times in order to let it iteratively converge to a stable equilibrium.
The final metric is expected to both respect the distances equalities inferred
during the exploration and be consistent in low dimension. As in the previous
simulation, we independently project the data described by the modified metric
in 2D and 3D.
Results: Figure 12 presents the 2D and 3D projections of the set
{M∗}
0
after the first and last iterations of the regularization process. Compared to the
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Figure 13: Opposite sides of each square in the grid of points of view are constrained, but not
their diagonals. This allows a residual curvature when the representational space is of higher
dimension than the manifold’s intrinsic dimension.
previous internal representation of Fig. 8, the metric regularization has greatly
impacted the shape of the projected manifold. Both 2D and 3D projections
still capture the topology of the grid of positions the sensor has visited but
now also exhibit a regular metric structure. Direct neighbors in the internal
representations now tend to be equidistant.
Thanks to the metric regularization, CCA has been able to project the data
in 2D without cutting the underlying manifold. Consequently the resulting
projection appears to be a good internal representation for the 2D spatial con-
figuration of the agent’s sensor. More precisely it is an affine transformation
of it, as can be seen in the metric comparison of Fig. 16(c). This shows that
the internal 2D representation is an excellent representation for its true external
counterpart. This is expected as the manifold of points of view is intrinsically
2-dimensional and thus fits perfectly in a 2D representational space after reg-
ularization. On the other hand, the final 3D projection appears as a slightly
folded version of the external grid of positions. Given the additional dimension
of the representational space and the equality constraints imposed on the metric,
such a seemingly developable manifold is a suitable solution for the projection.
Indeed the proposed exploration strategy ensures that the agent discovers that
opposite sides of any square in the grid should be equal in length, but does not
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Figure 14: Visualization of three reaching trajectories determined by using the 2D represen-
tational space, before and after the internal metric regularization. (a) Trajectories in the
representational spaces are straight (given the graph constraints they need to respect). (b)
The corresponding motor trajectories sometimes appear to jump around the motor space due
to the 2pi-periodicity of its metric. (c) The initial representational space generates curved
external trajectories of the sensor (ligh trajectories). After regularization of its metric, both
internal and external trajectories are straight (darker trajectories). (For the sake of visualiza-
tion, only 10% of the point of view sets are displayed in (b).)
enforce such a constraint regarding the two diagonals of this square, as illus-
trated in Fig. 13. As a consequence we can see in Fig. 16(c) that the internal 3D
projection is a good representation of its external counterpart for small distances
but that larger ones are underestimated due to the bending of the manifold.
4.3. Evaluating the internal representations
In order to evaluate the benefit of the metric regularization and the quality of
the final internal representation of the sensor’s spatial configuration, we propose
a simple reaching task for the agent to solve.
The task consists in finding the shortest path between a starting point of
view Ms and a target point of view Mt, both randomly drawn from
{M∗}
0
.
We are particularly interested in visualizing through which intermediary points
of view Mp the internal representation would require the agent to go during
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Figure 15: Visualization of three reaching trajectories determined by using the 3D represen-
tational space, before and after the internal metric regularization. (a) Trajectories in the
representational spaces are geodesics (given the graph constraints they need to respect). (b)
The corresponding motor trajectories sometimes appear to jump around the motor space due
to the 2pi-periodicity of its metric. (c) The initial representational space generates curved
external trajectories of the sensor (light trajectories). After regularization of its metric, the
trajectories they generate are straight (darker trajectories). (For the sake of visualization,
only 10% of the point of view sets are displayed in (b).)
the reaching. To do so, the set
{M∗}
0
is considered a graph in which each
Mi is a node and each dM(Mi,M′i) corresponds to the length (weight) of the
undirected edge between the nodes i and i′. Nevertheless such a fully connected
graph contains a direct link between any two nodes, that the agent could take
to reach Mt from Ms without the need for intermediary steps. We thus prune
the fully connected graph to retain only local connections. Any edge of length
greater than dM(Mi,M′i) = 0.72 is arbitrarily pruned. This value has been
manually set so that each node Mi is not connected to more than 50 nodes
around it. This way the search for the shortest path is required to use only local
transitions in the internal representation. Finally the optimal path betweenMs
andMt is determined by applying Dijkstra’s algorithm [6] on the pruned graph.
In order to keep the visualization uncluttered, only 3 pairs {Ms,Mt} are
randomly drawn for the evaluation. Four different internal representations are
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considered to solve the reaching tasks: the 2D and 3D representations before
regularization, and the 2D and 3D representations after regularization.
Note that the reaching task as been formalized at the level of points of view.
However points of view are an abstraction of the actual motor states the agent
controls. In order to know which motor states the agent has to go through during
the reaching task, we can look inside each intermediaryMp for the motor state
mp ∈Mp which is the closest to previous motor state:
mp = argminmk∈Mp
(
dm(mk,mp−1)
)
, (23)
with m0 = ms a starting motor state randomly drawn in Ms.
Results: The trajectories found by the agent for the two 2D representations
are displayed in Fig. 14. Their 3D counterparts are displayed in Fig. 15. For each
type of representation, we can see that the internal trajectories are topologically
consistent with the actual trajectories followed by the sensor in the external
space. This indicates that all internal representations correctly captured the
topology of the space of spatial configurations of the sensor, as was already
discussed in Sec. 3.3.
The internal metric regularization however greatly affects the trajectories
found by the agent. By construction the internal trajectories correspond to
straight lines (in 2D) and geodesics (in 3D). More precisely, they are as straight
as they can be, given the constraint of going through nodes in the grid and
the presence of a hole in the center of the working space. However, before
regularization their corresponding external trajectories appear curved. This is
due to the difference between the internal metric initially derived from the motor
space and the external Euclidean metric. On the contrary, after regularization,
the external trajectories also appear straight. This shows that the regularity of
the external Euclidean metric has been correctly captured by the regularized
representation.
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Figure 16: Comparisons between the external Euclidean metric computed on the grid of
positions taken by the sensor, the Hausdorff metric computed between the points of view, and
the internal metrics in the 2D and 3D representational spaces before and after regularization.
Each dot corresponds to a pair of positions taken randomly in the grid of positions (for the sake
of visualization, only a randomly selected 5% subset of all possible pairs are displayed, with
no qualitative impact on the results). The abscissa and ordinate of each dot in the different
plots correspond to the distance between the two positions in the corresponding metrics. (a)
The Hausdorff metric derived from the motor space greatly differs from the external metric.
Moreover the low-dimensional projections in 2D and 3D further distort the original Hausdorff
metric. This is particularly true for the 2D projection as we see that CCA was unable to
preserve larger distances. (b) The initial metrics in the 2D and 3D representational spaces
differ greatly from the external metric, for both small and large distances. The distortion
is even greater for the 2D space due to the impossibility for CCA to correctly unfold the
manifold of points of view. (c) After regularization, the final 2D and 3D metrics are a more
satisfying internal representations of the external metric. This is particularly true for the 2D
projection which is almost a perfect mapping due to the fact that the manifold is intrinsically
2D. However we can see that the 3D projection tends to underestimate larger distances. This
corresponds to the residual curvature of the manifold displayed in Fig. 12.
5. Discussion
The primary goal of this work was to define the sensorimotor structure un-
derlying the perception of space by a naive agent. This includes understanding
how spatial knowledge is grounded in the agent’s sensorimotor experience, why
it is relevant for the agent to extract it, but also how this sensorimotor structure
relates to the properties that characterize our subjective perception of space.
These properties are that space contains both the agent and its environment,
that it is invariant to its content, and that it is isotropic.
Taking inspiration from the SMCT and intuitions by H.Poincare´, we pro-
posed to ground spatial knowledge in the way an agent can transform its sen-
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sorimotor experience. More precisely this led us to consider displacements as
a suitable way to characterize space. Fundamentally space is indeed the frame
that allows displacement. More interesting, displacements of the agent can also
be internally distinguished from other sensorimotor experiences thanks to their
sensory redundancy with displacements in the environment (and vice versa).
They also support the spatial characteristics we want to capture: both the
agent and its environment can undergo displacements, any content of space can
be displaced, and displacements can be carried out the same way regardless of
the agent’s position and orientation. Our assumption is that the sensory redun-
dancy induced by displacements is worthy for a naive agent to capture. Such
knowledge indeed enables it to predict the sensory outcome of some of its motor
commands. It also offers a more compact way to represent the agent’s sensori-
motor experience. Finally, the structure of the set of displacements an agent can
produce is independent of the content of the environment, which ensures some
generalization capacities for the agent. Overall, space would then be a conve-
nient and useful way for the agent to account for its redundant sensorimotor
experiences.
Two simulations have been proposed in this paper to illustrate how a naive
agent can discover displacements in its raw sensorimotor experience and how it
can derive from it the topology and metric regularity of its spatial configuration.
The simulated system involved a simple robotic arm observing an object made
of multiple light sources through an eye-like sensor. By observing displacements
of an object and trying to compensate for them from a sensory perspective, the
agent was able to isolate the motor changes which are redundant with changes
in the environment. We then proposed to capture the structure underlying
these specific motor changes and to build an internal representation of them.
This representation was based on the pre-definition of the proto-spatial concept
of point of view which compacts the agent’s experience by grouping together
motor states which are equivalent from a sensory perspective (or mechanically
redundant from an external perspective). After the agent experiences the possi-
bility of compensating multiple object displacements from a single initial point
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of view, the resulting internal representation it builds successfully captures the
topology of its sensor’s position in the external space. Moreover, by compen-
sating for multiple object displacements from different initial points of view, we
showed how the metric of the internal representation can be modified to capture
the metric regularity of space, making the final internal representation a good
internal representation for the sensor’s external spatial configuration. Finally we
showed how this internal representation can be used to solve simple spatial tasks,
like finding the shortest path (both internally and externally) in a reaching task.
It is important to notice that the sensorimotor characterization of space
we put forward is independent of the particular encoding of the motor and
sensory information, and also independent of the structure of the agent’s body.
Obviously the sensory states experienced by an agent depend on the nature
and characteristics of its sensors, and the actions it can perform in the world
depend on the nature and characteristics of its motor. Yet the existence of
redundant transformations between the agent and its environment is induced by
the structure of external space, on which the agent’s hardware has no influence.
Through its exploration of the world, an agent is thus bound to experience these
specific transformations, although they might be encoded differently for different
agents. This independence to the encoding and importance of embodiment in
the grounding of perceptual experience is directly in line with the SMCT.
Of course this encoding-independence has its limits. One could for example
imagine an agent with sensors so simple or exotic that they would destroy or
not capture the information needed by the agent to discover space. More in-
teresting, limited motor capacities could also prevent an agent to fully explore
the structure of space. An agent lacking the degrees of freedom to produce mo-
tor changes redundant with some displacements in the environment (and thus
compensate for them) would not interpret them as displacements but as state
changes. The resulting internal representation of space would thus be truncated.
In our simulated system, if the object was also able to move along a depth axis
(3D space), the agent, still restricted to motions in the plane, would neverthe-
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less build a 2D internal representation of space. Consequently any displacement
of the object orthogonal to this plane would be interpreted as a state change,
similarly to the way we perceive rotations of a 4D hypercube as changes in 3D
structure. Although incomplete from an external perspective, this truncated
characterization of space is nevertheless adapted and useful for the agent which
cannot have any effect in this extra spatial dimension.
In our simulations, we purposefully designed an opposite setting in which we
limited the degrees of freedom of objects. Objects were limited to translations
in the plane, without the possibility of rotation. Consequently, any rotation of
the sensor is not redundant with any potential environmental change. Although
artificial, this setting allowed us to restrain displacements identifiable as such
by the agent to an easily visualized set of 2D translations, while rotations of the
agents’ sensor are interpreted as state changes. The final results demonstrated
that rotations have been correctly excluded from the internal representations
built by the agent.
Our characterization of space gives the possibility of incomplete representa-
tion of space, but it can also lead to the discovery of extra spatial dimensions.
This would happen if the agent was able to generate motor changes redundant
with some state changes in the environment (and thus to compensate for them).
One can for instance imagine an agent able to control the sensitivity of its sen-
sors, which would then be redundant with an overall change of light intensity in
the environment. This redundant state change would thus be incorporated in the
internal representation of the agent as an extra ”spatial” dimension. Although
incorrect from an external perspective, this representation would yet again be
adapted and useful for the agent which can compensate for these specific state
changes as if they were displacements.
Note also that even in a standard setting – like our simulations in which the
agent correctly discovers the expected spatial dimensions – the internal repre-
sentation of space cannot capture all properties of space. Indeed some of them
like its unit of length or its orientation are arbitrarily defined by an external
observer. Consequently the scale and orientation of the internal representation
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is different from its external counterpart (grid of positions). The agent has no
means to access these properties, but also no incentive to do so as they have no
relevance to its ability to change its spatial configuration.
The general approach and simulations we proposed in this paper give some
insight into the sensorimotor grounding of the concept of space. Yet they also
have multiple limitations. The agent-environment system we considered is rel-
atively simple. The agent is a single serial arm equipped with a single low
dimensional sensor. Although the concept of redundancy/compensability holds
for more complex agents (see for instance an agent equipped with two inde-
pendent moving eyes and two ears in [17]), the occurrence of compensation
experiences appears less probable, and the tracking-like behavior more difficult
to achieve. For instance, imagine the agent was made of two arms instead of
one. Compensable experiences would consist in jointly moving both arm tips
in a rigid fashion to follow the displacements of an object. On the contrary,
moving a single arm would be interpreted as a state change. Thus compensable
experiences are not impossible but more difficult to encounter when the agent
gets more complex. An interesting solution to this problem could be for the
agent to build multiple local notions of space (one for each arm in the previous
example) by experiencing redundancy/compensability in subspaces of its whole
sensory space. At a later developmental stage, all these local descriptions of
space could be united in a single consistent internal representation which would
capture information about both space and the structure of the agent’s body.
The simplicity of the agent mechanical structure also allowed us to imple-
ment a method for estimating basic points of view. It takes advantage of the
fact that the arm has a single mechanical degree of redundancy and hinge joints,
making each point of view a closed 1D manifold. The method would however
not directly scale up to manifolds of greater dimensions and/or with boundaries.
The environment considered in the simulations is also very simple; it comes
down to a single object made up of rigidly connected light sources. This unre-
alistic setup was proposed for the simplicity of the simulation, and to guarantee
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the possibility of compensation in the system. In the presence of a more com-
plex environment made up of multiple objects, the displacement of a single
object would generate a sensory variation that the agent could not entirely
compensate. Indeed the tracking of the moving object would also lead to a
relative motion of all the other objects that did not move. A potential solution
to adapt the approach to more realistic environments would be to identify re-
dundancy/compensability in sensory subspaces that capture information about
only a subpart of the environment (similar to a receptive field in the retina).
This way the agent could track the moving object in such a subspace, while
discarding the variations it generates in the rest of the sensory space during its
exploration. Another solution would consist in assuming that the environment
is static most of the time but that the agent can move its base in space, the
same way we can move on our feet. Such a displacement of the base would be
equivalent, from a sensory perspective, to an opposite displacement of the whole
environment that the agent could try to compensate by moving the rest of its
body. This would however suggest that only agents capable of moving their base
in the world are able to develop a notion of space. To avoid this unnecessary
limitation, a mix of both solutions appears more promising.
The methods we proposed in this paper are partly based on analytic solu-
tions which rely on the knowledge of the arm’s forward model and Jacobian, as
well as the actual displacement of the object in space. The primary purpose of
the computational method implemented in these simulations is thus illustrative.
They are unrealistic from a developmental standpoint in which these informa-
tion are not accessible to the naive agent. One could however consider possible
solutions to avoid these analytic shortcuts. They would require the development
of exploration strategies that efficiently discover motor states which always gen-
erate equivalent sensory states, or those which compensate for a given sensory
change. The building of the internal representation could also be made more
realistic by using for example a neural network like was already proposed in
[19]. Such approaches should also be made robust to more realistic exploration
scenarios in which the agent cannot necessarily sample its whole working space
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between two displacements of the object. This should not present a challenge,
as our approach is theoretically able to accommodate itself to an incremental
discovery of all displacements. The only fundamental assumption that needs
to be respected is that the agent can statistically move more often than the
environmental state changes. Otherwise it would be impossible for the agent to
estimate the effect of its actions on a sensory flow which is constantly changing
at a rapid rate due to the environment.
It is also important to notice that, although internal representations were
built in the two simulations of this paper, we do not claim that such explicit
representations are necessary for an agent to interact with its environment. In-
deed all relevant information about space topology and metric regularity are
contained in the internal metric derived from the motor space and modified by
the redundancies discovered by the agent. The metric knowledge is sufficient
to define the manifolds the agent has to capture without the need for low-
dimensional embedding. This is for instance illustrated in section 4.3 in which
only the knowledge of the metric dM(M,M), representing the estimated dis-
tances between underlying sets of motor states, is used to solve the reaching task.
Thus, beyond their illustrative power, we do not argue that the low-dimensional
representations built in this work are necessary for spatial knowledge. We rather
think that the predictive capacity supported by the sensorimotor invariants is
constitutive of this spatial knowledge (for instance, knowing that a set of motor
commands would generate the same sensory input as the one currently experi-
enced). In our second simulation, the explicit embedding of the metric in low di-
mension has however been useful to enforce consistency (see section 4.2). Other
ways to regularize the metric could nonetheless be considered. For instance by
observing rotations as well as successive displacements of objects, it might be
possible for the agent to discover relations between the different distances that
constitute its internal metric, without the need for a low-dimensional embed-
ding that the agent has a priori no incentive to produce. Interestingly such a
regularization would also solve the problem of inconsistent diagonal lengths that
was noticed in Fig. 13 and led to a curved internal representation in Fig.12.
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Although desirable to fully regularize the internal metric, the addition of
rotations in the system introduces other problems. In this paper rotations have
artificially been kept out of the simulations by allowing only translations of the
object. Consequently any rotation of the sensor is considered a state change,
due to a lack of compensability, and ignored in the building of the internal
representation. Yet in a more realistic setting, rotations in the plane are also
compensable and should therefore also be considered displacements in a math-
ematical sense. This has been partly illustrated in [21] in which a similar agent
captures both translations and rotations of its sensor in a 3D internal repre-
sentation. The low-dimensional projection of such a 3D manifold is however
made difficult by the looped third dimension induced by rotations. It makes
it impossible to project and visualize the data in 3D, although it corresponds
to the manifold’s intrinsic dimension. But more importantly, the addition of
rotations would disrupt the metric regularization method we proposed in this
paper. Indeed for a rotation of the object, the amplitude of the compensating
displacement of the sensor depends on the distance to the center of rotation.
Thus the regularization of the metric along the dimension related to rotations
would not be straightforward. A solution to this problem could be to distin-
guish rotations from translations, based on their different properties. Rotations
and translations for instance do not follow the same compositionality rules: the
order of translations in a sequence of transformations does not affect the end
result, which is not true for rotations. Another property is that dimensions
associated with rotations loop on themselves. Finally, unlike translations, ro-
tations keep points unchanged in space (the axis of rotation). These different
properties relate to our subjective experience of rotations. Studying how they
manifest themselves in an agent’s sensorimotor experience might be the way to
better capture them in the internal representation of spatial configuration.
Beyond the several potential improvements of the current simulations we
just mentioned, future work on the sensorimotor grounding of space perception
has to answer many important questions. In our approach spatial knowledge
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is fundamentally rooted in the motor space. As presented in this paper, it
provides a characterization of the agent ’s spatial configuration. Yet our spatial
perception extends past our own body to include our environment. Thus in
order to reach a more complete perception of space, it is necessary to develop
the sensorimotor framework to account for the spatial configuration of objects
in the environment. As proposed by H.Poincare´ [40], this knowledge should
fundamentally be interpreted by the agent via its own capacity to generate
spatial changes. The distance to an object would for instance be internally
encoded as the motor command needed to reach it. This way the agent can
ground these external properties it cannot directly access in its motor space,
which it can access and control. In order to fully answer this question, one will
probably have to also tackle the problem of object perception and how it can
co-emerge with the notion of space. Some preliminary steps have already been
done in this direction [16, 15]. Only once the grounding of spatial knowledge
presented in this work has been extended to the spatial configuration of the
environment will it be possible to consider complex applications for robotics,
like navigation or object manipulation.
Finally our long term objective is to let a robot build its own grounded knowl-
edge of how its body and objects around it behave in space, first by theoretically
defining the type of sensorimotor structure which supports this knowledge and
second by developing algorithmic solutions to capture this structure. This spa-
tial common-sense knowledge could then be re-used in an open-ended manner
to efficiently solve unforeseen spatial tasks the robot would face in the world.
Nonetheless, beyond this technical motivation, we also aim to shed some light
on the fundamental nature of space and how our perception of space emerges.
We try to trace back the origin of our subjective experience of space and explic-
itly define how its peculiar properties manifest themselves in our sensorimotor
experience.
On a more philosophical side, the approach developed in this paper sug-
gests that the concept of space might emerge from sensorimotor interactions
with the environment, without the need for specific spatial prior knowledge. In
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that sense, and within the current discussion about the importance of priors
in artificial intelligence [22, 28, 46], our approach suggests the possibility of a
fully data-driven emergence of perception. However this claim needs to be put
in perspective, since the mechanisms that would lead an agent to capture the
sensorimotor invariants supporting spatial knowledge are not yet fully under-
stood (in particular from an algorithmic point of view). Nevertheless we aim at
pushing the SMCT-based approach we have developed as far as possible using
the assumption of minimal prior knowledge. This has also led us to challenge
the idea that the convolution mechanism used in today’s successful convolu-
tional neural networks, and often considered an argument for the necessity of
priors, has to be pre-implemented in the perceptive system [15]. Regardless of
the unfolding of this theoretical debate and its consequence for the field of arti-
ficial perception, it is nonetheless probable that natural selection has endowed
us with particular priors to bootstrap and speed up the development of our
perceptive abilities. This would of course include priors about the concept of
space, which would certainly be very useful due to the pervasiveness of space
in our perception of the world. On the other hand, the presence of such priors
in our brain, proven or not, does not solve the problem of roboticists who still
need to identify and implement them in their robots if they want to accelerate
their development.
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